Fall 2000
	Cover Story Doing the REIT Thing Western Properties’ Brad Blake and Bradley’s Tom D’Arcy put their shareholders first. Now they’re looking for work. Company Spotlight Failure to Communicate The "REIT Story" is a good one. Unfortunately, many companies haven’t done as good a job as they should have in telling it. Sector Spotlight Critical Conditions Opportunities among the healthcare REITs, but be careful out there. The New Economy Plugged In Making Money in the Internet Age Tracking The Market Bye, Bye Bear Market Blues After two of the worst years in their 40-year history, REITs have staged a strong comeback. By The Numbers Much Better, Thank You Real estate fund managers may never live down the 1998-99 bear market, but at least these days they can go out in public. Washington Wire Legislative Relief No legislation in the roughly 40-year history of REITs had the potential to alter the landscape more dramatically than the recently enacted REIT Modernization Act. Investment Basics Just How Safe Are REIT Dividends, REALLY? Yield-conscious investors drawn to REITs by their "rich" yields need to look beyond what’s printed in the stock tables of their daily newspapers. Investment Insight Opposites Attract It didn’t come as a surprise to portfolio managers at LaSalle Investment Management that REITs soared when tech stocks hit the wall this past spring. Investment Fundamentals NAV Growth: A Meaningful Performance Yardstick Growing FFO and enhancing shareholder value are not always one and the same. Focusing on NAV growth is a better, though not perfect, alternative suggests Green Street’s Mike Kirby and Jon Fosheim. Editor's Note The Journey Continues ... Parting Shot Wrestling With Net Asset Value The Penobscot Group’s Frederick S. Carr Jr. questions whether the market is telling investors that NAV is irrelevant. Newsline Urban To Be Acquired By Rodamco For $3.4 Billion Investor's Guide Questions Back Issues Feedback

By Mike Kirby and Jon Fosheim

The goal of a good management team is to create shareholder wealth. All too often, this goal is confused with the goal of growing FFO. In many instances, capital investments that result in higher FFO are, indeed, additive to shareholder wealth. However, deals that are accretive to FFO can easily be destructive to shareholder value, and many REIT management teams have been surprised at negative market reaction to deals that management justified by touting FFO accretion. NAV growth represents a better, though still imperfect, benchmark than FFO growth. Historical NAV growth assists in assessing management track records, and this report provides NAV growth histories for the companies in our coverage universe.

Last Six Years June 30, 1994 - June 30, 2000
Company	Annual NAV Growth	Annualized Total Returns
Spieker Properties	17.72%	23.21%
Vornado	16.69%	18.32%
Equity Residential	12.25%	15.41%
Avalon Bay	11.08%	20.13%
Post Properties	8.21%	13.61%
General Growth	8.01%	13.16%
Kimco Realty	7.92%	16.30%
Manufactured Home	7.80%	10.54%
Camden Prop Trust	6.35%	11.45%
Chateau Communities	6.23%	11.46%
Summit Properties	6.10%	10.20%
Colonial Properties	5.68%	11.89%
Urban Shop Centers	5.51%	15.34%
Washington REIT	5.42%	5.11%
Liberty Prop Trust	5.18%	13.35%
Developers Diversified	4.82%	8.21%
United Dominion	4.70%	4.15%
Amli Resid Props	4.64%	10.33%
Gables Residential	4.57%	10.55%
CarrAmerica	4.36%	12.25%
CBL & Associates	3.87%	12.11%
Regency Realty	3.44%	13.33%
Weingarten Realty	2.68%	8.18%
New Plan Excel	1.92%	11.23%
Federal Realty	1.90%	3.99%
Mills Corporation	0.39%	6.43%
Taubman Centers	0.29%	7.44%
Town & Country	0.00%	9.93%
Rouse Company	(0.56%)	9.62%
IRT Property	(0.79%)	6.84%
Western Prop Trust	(0.90%)	6.54%
Simon Property Group	(0.92%)	6.09%
Associated Estates	(9.33%)	(5.76%)
Crown American	(12.64%)	(5.17%)
Average	4.19%	10.17%
Median	4.67%	10.55%
R2 (total returns vs. NAV growth)		.78

NAV growth for the REITs in our coverage universe averaged 4 percent per year over the last six years. This is a disappointing result vs. what one would have expected in a robust economic environment in which reported same-property NOI growth has been solid. Additionally, the 4 percent growth rate was achieved during a period in which many REITs were able to boost NAV growth rates by merely issuing equity at premiums to NAV. The table on the next page shows NAV growth alongside total returns for companies that have been in our coverage universe over the past six years (that is, June 1994 through June 2000).

A few possible explanations exist as to why NAV growth has been lower than might have been expected. First, capitalized expenditures required to merely maintain competitiveness are sizable (we have opined on numerous occasions that real estate market participants underestimate the magnitude of these costs; see "The High Cost of Real Estate Ownership," Property, Fall 2000, page 40) and represent a "leak" in the NAV growth pipeline that might otherwise be expected based on NOI growth. Also, some REITs have demonstrated an overwillingness to grow (often citing FFO accretion as justification) at times when issuing new shares has been dilutive to NAV. Finally, cap rates have, on average, increased over this period.

Retail REITs have turned in the worst NAV growth, while office and apartment REITs generally have done materially better than the average, although notable exceptions exist at the company level in each sector. The performance turned in by retail REITs is at least partially attributable to particularly large increases in cap rates in this sector.

Changes in NAV serve as a good predictor of total returns: 78 percent of the variance in total returns among the REITs we cover can be explained by changes in NAV. While a correlation of this sort is no surprise, it is more robust than might have been expected.

Flawed, Perhaps...But Better Than Any Alternative
NAV growth represents a more desirable managerial goal and, therefore, a better performance benchmark than FFO or AFFO growth. Using FFO accretion as a benchmark for making investment decisions can result in the wrong decision for many reasons, including: (1) variances in asset quality (e.g., buying higher yielding, but higher risk/lower growth assets) can impact FFO accretion; (2) variances in leverage (e.g., increased leverage resulting from an acquisi-tion increases FFO growth) affect the accretion, but shouldn’t affect value; (3) changes in cap rates over time can impact value, but are ignored in FFO; and (4) because FFO systematically overstates true economic performance, FFO accretion almost always overstates the real benefits from an acquisition. This last point is subtle, but some deals that are accretive to FFO are actually dilutive to AFFO. By using AFFO as a benchmark, management teams avoid trap number four. By using NAV growth as a benchmark, management teams can do even better.

Mere growth in any of these benchmarks-including NAV-does not necessarily imply that value has been created. A transaction that results in higher NAV is not necessarily a good transaction, as NAV growth represents an imper-fect proxy for the best hurdle: Net Present Value growth. For example, a REIT trading at a rich price is likely accorded its valuation due to the market’s perception that management is able to create an unusually high amount of NAV for every dollar deployed. If that REIT deploys capital into a less lucrative, but still-NAV-accretive investment, it may well see its share price suffer. Similarly, a REIT trading at a high premium to NAV can create NAV by merely issuing new shares, but unless those proceeds are wisely deployed, shareholder value will suffer. Also, a dilutive-to-NAV investment is not, by definition, a bad investment. Finally, NAV growth can be circular, as high premiums beget NAV growth, which in turn helps justify high premiums. Focusing on NAV growth is a better benchmark than looking at FFO/AFFO growth, but it is far from perfect.

NAV Growth Belongs in the Toolbox
Clearly the data contained herein, like total return statistics, are backward looking. It is of only limited value, for example, to docu-ment that Spieker’s NAV has soared in recent years. In retrospect, it is clear that the San Francisco Bay area is the center of the New Economy and that real estate prices have taken a giant step forward. It is unlikely that another giant step is in the offing.

That said, with some interpretation, the data can help tell a story. Spieker, for example, unlike many of its peers, did not dilute its regional story with a national growth plan. In addition, Spieker shut down its acquisition machinery quicker than most and has never gotten itself into a balance sheet "box." With strong financial management and disciplined growth, Spieker has been better able than most to "pick its spots" with respect to equity issuance.

Spieker’s strong ranking in this survey is part luck (i.e., owning Silicon Valley real estate), part management savvy. Historical NAV growth statistics do not make this distinction clear and must, like all historical measures, be taken with a grain of salt.

Other REITs, such as General Growth and Kimco, warrant a great deal of credit for finishing near the top of the heap despite the fact that their retail-REIT brethren generally fared poorly. A cynical view would be that they generated this growth primarily through the easy route of issuing equity at premium prices,but this unfairly ignores the fact that these two companies have shown they are deserving of premium pricing due to their history of intelligently allocating capital. By contrast, the large number of REITs that have experienced next to no NAV growth have some explaining to do.

While numerous other criteria exist for measuring managerial performance, the NAV growth yardstick belongs in every investor’s toolbox.

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